

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD1869, PM HOPES TO COMPLETE SELECTION OF SECURITY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tag **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06BAGHDAD1869**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06BAGHDAD1869	2006-06-03 16:14	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Baghdad

Appears in these articles:

<http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/wikileaks/Wikleaks-US-anger-at-Gordon.6779840.jp>
<http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikleaks-Gordon-Brown-39wanted-to.6779847.jp>
<http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikleaks-Iraqi-premier-feared-British.6779849.jp>
<http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikleaks-Tories-asked-to-oppose.6779848.jp>
<http://news.scotsman.com/opinion/Leader-Historical-insight.6779771.jp>

VZCZCXRO6898
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1869 1541614
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031614Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4862
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001869

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [IZ](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#)

SUBJECT: PM HOPES TO COMPLETE SELECTION OF SECURITY
MINISTERS SOON; DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT BASRAH

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD PER 1.4 B AND D.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 1 meeting with Ambassador, PM Maliki repeated his intent to complete selection soon of Ministers of Defense and Interior. MinDef will be either Abdel Qader al-Mufraji (if Kurds can be brought on board) or Nabil Khalil Saeed. MinInt candidates are Tawfiq Yasserli or Farouk al-Araji. PM returned from Basrah deeply concerned about security and economic deterioration but energized about addressing Basrah's problems quickly. PM's views on new U.S. position on talking to Iran, need for GOI approach to UNSC on UNSCR 1637 reported septels. END SUMMARY.

Visit to Basrah Deeply Troubling

¶2. (C) In a June 1 meeting, Ambassador commended PM Maliki for his visit to Basrah the previous day and the positive impact of his "iron fist" public remarks. Maliki, who several times during the meeting noted his "deep, deep concern" about the situation in Basrah, cited the long list of urgent problems: violent tribal and political rivalries; totally dysfunctional and compromised police force; mafia-like gangs menacing the city; probable nefarious foreign involvement; and overall collapse of the infrastructure. In his discussions with Basrah leaders, Maliki said that he heard complaints about British forces, including allegations they are assassinating people - which the PM said he already has discussed with the UK Ambassador.

¶3. (C) When Ambassador asked what he needs from the U.S., Maliki said that he needs an urgent security plan and resources for reconstruction. Maliki explained that he established an emergency security committee in Basrah. (NOTE: In a separate meeting, VP Tariq al-Hashemi identified members of the committee: the Governor, Badr Corps head Hadi al-Amri, former Minister of Transportation Salah Maliki, Minister of Provincial Affairs Saad Taher al-Hashemi, and an unidentified Tawafuq representative. END NOTE.) Maliki said that the Iraqi Army is respected by the people of Basrah and that, as of June 1, they would be manning the city's checkpoints. Although Maliki has asked the Basrah emergency committee to devise a security plan, he accepted the Ambassador's suggestion that MNF-I CG Casey return the next day for further discussion on security requirements.

¶4. (C) The PM also said that the people of Basrah need to see some improvement in their infrastructure. The University is a disaster; they have limited electricity and no drinkable water; and they need a bridge over the Shatt al-Arab, Maliki said. Ambassador promised to return in a few days with ideas for projects that might be undertaken in Basrah, but noted that the security situation makes reconstruction projects problematic. The PM insisted that the people of Basrah are ready for change, and if he loses Basrah, he said he fears that other Iraqi cities could also collapse. The number of trained Iraqi forces are inadequate for the task, Maliki said, and he needs to increase their number quickly. Of the 15,000 policemen, only 3000 are real - the other are paper policemen.

On Track to Name MOI/MOD

¶5. (S) Ambassador told the PM that the U.S. is comfortable with either Abdel Qader Al-Mufraji or Nabil Khalil Saeed as MinDef. Ambassador said he is sending a message to Masud Barzani on Abdel Qader and, if necessary, would go in person to see him (Barzani). Likewise, Ambassador added, the U.S. believes that Tawfiq Yasserli or Farouq al-Araji are acceptable candidates for MinInt, although Yasserli is the stronger of the two. The PM said accepted this and asked for results of the outreach to Barzani as soon as possible.

Other Topics

[¶](#)6. (C) Maliki's response to Ambassador's points on Iran, UNSCR 1637, and the Iraq Compact are covered in septels.
KHALILZAD